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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

DAVID LESLIE FIFE,

:

Case No. 950256-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from the trial
court's Judgment and Commitment entered March 20, 1995.
R. 97-99.

A copy of the Judgment and Commitment is contained in

Addendum A.

Pursuant to that Judgment and Commitment, the trial

court committed Appellant to the Salt Lake County Jail for the
one-year maximum sentence without giving him credit for
presentence time he was confined at the Utah State Hospital.
R. 89, 97-99.

Appellant was released on June 9, 1995 from the

Salt Lake County Jail after serving a one-year sentence in
addition to the time he was held at the Utah State Hospital on a
determination that he was incompetent to proceed.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1994).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial judge commit reversible error in refusing
to give Appellant credit for the presentence time confined at the

Utah State Hospital based on a determination that he was
incompetent to stand trial in this case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the trial court was required
to give Appellant credit for time served at the Hospital is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v.
Rawlincrs, 893 P.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah App. 1994), citing State
v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991).

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
Appellant argued at the time the trial judge imposed
sentence following revocation of probation that Appellant should
be given credit for all time served, including the 257 days spent
at the Utah State Hospital after the trial court determined that
Appellant was incompetent to stand trial.
to Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal.

R. 87-90, supplement
See Addendum B for a

copy of the Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal and the
supplement to the Agreed Statement.

Appellant based his argument

on State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987), and Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), and the legal concepts contained
therein.

See supplementation to Agreed Statement contained in

Addendum B.

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes and constitutional
provisions is contained in Addendum C:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (Cum. Supp. 1994) 1
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-3 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (Cum. Supp. 1994) 2
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6 (Cum. Supp. 1994) 3
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-8 (1995)
Amendment V, United States Constitution
Amendment XIV, United States Constitution

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information dated July 28, 1992, the State charged
Defendant/Appellant David Leslie Fife with Forcible Sexual Abuse,
a second degree felony.

R. 010-011.

On May 6, 1994, after

having twice been found incompetent to proceed, Appellant entered
a plea of guilty to Attempted Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third
degree felony.

R. 52-53, 66.

On July 18, 1994, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402,
the trial court sentenced Appellant on a class A misdemeanor.

1

This statute was modified slightly following the
determination of incompetency in this case. Addendum C contains
the text of the version of the statute in effect at the time of
the determination of incompetency.
2

This statute was modified slightly following the
determination of incompetency in this case. Addendum C contains
the text of the version of the statute in effect at the time of
the determination of incompetency.
3

This statute was modified slightly following the
determination of incompetency in this case. Addendum C contains
the text of the version of the statute in effect at the time of
the determination of incompetency.

3

Pursuant to that sentence, Appellant was to serve the maximum
possible one-year sentence at the Salt Lake County Jail,

R. 66.

The trial judge stayed the jail sentence and placed Appellant on
probation.

R. 66-7.

On March 1, 1995, the trial judge issued an Order to Show
Cause why probation should not be revoked or modified.

R. 80.

On March 20, 1995, the trial court issued its order revoking
probation and refusing to give Appellant credit for 257 days
served at the Utah State Hospital after a determination that
Appellant was incompetent to stand trial.
Addendum A.

R. 97-99.

See

Defendant Fife appeals from this order.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal, the
supplementation thereto and the district court record outline the
following facts:
Officers arrested Appellant on the charges in the instant
case on July 24, 1992.

R. 87.

Appellant was released from the

jail on July 29, 1992, after having served five days.

R. 87.

On March 24, 1993, Appellant was rearrested and held in
the Salt Lake County Jail without bail on the charge in the
present case and an additional charge.

R. 87.

On May 17, 1993,

the district court judge found Appellant incompetent to proceed
and ordered that he be committed to the Utah State Hospital.
R. 34, 87-8.

The court ordered further that Appellant "be

remanded to the custody of the County Sheriff."

4

R. 34.

On

May 21, 1993, Appellant was transported and committed to the Utah
State Hospital.

R. 88.

After Appellant had served 165 days at the Utah State
Hospital, the district court judge ordered that the Salt Lake
County Sheriff transport Appellant from the Hospital to the
district court on November 1, 1993.

R. 36, 88.

At the

November 1, 1993 hearing, the trial judge found that Appellant
was competent to stand trial and reinstated the no-bail hold.
R. 37.
On February 3, 1994, the district court judge again found
Appellant incompetent to stand trial and ordered "that David L.
Fife be committed to the Utah State Hospital until such time that
[the] court finds that he is competent to proceed."
(emphasis added).

R. 46, 88

The commitment was "made pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 77-15-6 (1993)."

R. 47, 88.

On February 9, 1994,

Appellant was again transported and committed to the Utah State
Hospital.

R. 88.

On May 4, 1994, the district court judge ordered "the
Utah State Hospital to transport[] Defendant to the Salt Lake
County Jail and hold him there pending hearing with Judge
Medley."

R. 50.

On May 11, 1994, after being held an additional

92 days at the Hospital, Appellant was transported back to the
Salt Lake County Jail and held without bail.

R. 88.

On June 6, 1994, Appellant appeared before the trial

5

judge, who found Appellant competent to proceed.

R. 53.

Appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of
guilty to Attempted Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third degree felony.
R. 52-3, 88.

Appellant entered his guilty plea with the

understanding that he would "be sentenced as a Class A
misdemeanor [pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §] 76-3-402, if not he
can withdraw his plea of guilty."

R. 54.

On July 18, 1994, the trial judge sentenced Appellant
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 to a class A misdemeanor.
R. 88.

The trial judge sentenced Appellant to serve the maximum

allowable twelve-month sentence at the Salt Lake County Jail, but
stayed that jail sentence and placed Appellant on probation.
R. 66.

At that time, Appellant had been continuously held in

either the Salt Lake County Jail or the Utah State Hospital since
March 24, 1993.

R. 87-89.

On February 23, 1995, Appellant was arrested on a bench
warrant issued in this case based on an allegation of probation
violation and held without bail in the Salt Lake County Jail.
88.

R.

On March 13, 1995, Appellant appeared before the trial judge

for an order to show cause hearing.

At that hearing, the trial

judge found that Appellant had "violated the terms and conditions
of his probation."

R. 85.

The judge revoked probation and

committed Appellant for the maximum sentence of one year.

The

judge gave Appellant credit for 265 days served at the Salt Lake
County Jail but refused to give him credit for the time in which
he was committed to the Utah State Hospital based on

6

determinations that he was incompetent to stand trial.

R. 85-86,

89, 97-99.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court violated Appellant Fife's rights to equal
protection, due process and freedom from double jeopardy when it
refused to credit 257 days of pretrial commitment at the Utah
State Hospital towards the maximum sentence.

State v. Richards,

740 P.2d 1314, and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, establish
that Appellant's rights were violated by the extended
incarceration in this case.

Appellant was required to serve 257

days longer than similarly situated criminal defendants who were
either able to post bail or who were detained in the jail prior
to trial.

In addition, Appellant was committed to the Hospital

for 257 uncredited days based on a lesser required standard than
would be used for a civil commitment.

Additionally, Appellant's

rights to due process and freedom from double jeopardy were
violated where he was required to serve 257 days beyond the
maximum sentence; this extension beyond the maximum statutory
sentence resulted in multiple punishment for the same offense.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT CREDIT
TOWARD THE MAXIMUM ONE-YEAR SENTENCE FOR 257
DAYS IN WHICH HE WAS CRIMINALLY COMMITTED TO
THE STATE HOSPITAL BASED ON A DETERMINATION
THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT TO PROCEED ON THIS
CASE.

7

The trial judge sentenced Appellant to the maximum
allowable term of one year.

R. 98.

In so doing, the trial court

gave Appellant credit for 265 days he had served on this case in
the Salt Lake County Jail but refused to give him credit for 257
days of pretrial commitment to the Utah State Hospital.
98.

R. 89,

By refusing to credit the 257 days of pretrial commitment at

the Utah State Hospital, the trial court violated Appellant's
right to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the protection
against double jeopardy guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.4
While there is no Utah or United States Supreme Court
case law which explicitly requires that the trial judge give
credit against a maximum sentence for time confined to the Utah
State Hospital, the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v.
Richards, 74 0 P.2d at 1314, provides guidance.

In

Richards, the Supreme Court held "that the Equal Protection
Clause requires that credit against any sentence must be given
for all presentence incarceration imposed on a defendant because

4

Because the trial court sentenced Appellant to a
class A misdemeanor sentence with a maximum one-year sentence and
committed him to the Salt Lake County Jail, the trial court, not
the Board of Pardons, had jurisdiction to give Appellant the
requested credit against his sentence. See State v. Richards,
740 P.2d at 1315. Compare State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207,
208-09 (Utah App. 1988) (Board of Pardons has jurisdiction to
apply credit for time served where defendant consented to be
committed to state prison on class A misdemeanor and statute
gives Board authority over individuals serving time at state
penal or correctional facilities).

8

he or she cannot post bail."

Richards, 74 0 P.2d at 1317.

The

Court reasoned:
While it is true that Richards' pretrial
incarceration was not technically part of the
punishment imposed for the crime committed, it
was a loss of liberty occasioned by his having
been charged with a crime and his inability to
post bail. Thus, the total time he had to spend
in jail, counting his pretrial detention, was
greater than it otherwise would have been but for
his economic status.
Richards, 740 P.2d at 1316.
The Richards court determined that Richards must be given
credit for pretrial detention pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court decisions in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90
S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971).
1316.

Richards, 740 P.2d at

While not directly on point, Williams established that the

State "may not imprison a person beyond the statutory maximum
solely because of his or her indigency."

Richards, 740 P.2d at

1316, citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 241-42, 90 S.Ct. at 2022.
Together, Williams and Tate established that "discrimination
based on ability to pay a fine violates the Equal Protection
Clause."

Richards, 740 P.2d at 1316.
Although not directly on point, the United States Supreme

Court decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, provides the
same type of guidance to this Court in the instant case that
Williams and Tate provided to the Richards court.

In Jackson,

the Court applied both a due process and equal protection
analysis where the defendant, who had "little likelihood of

9

improvement," had been held pursuant to a criminal commitment for
over three years.

Under the equal protection analysis, the Court

held that the use of a lower criminal commitment standard than
that which was used for civil commitment proceedings, and
subjecting Jackson "to a more stringent standard of release than
those generally applicable to all others not charged with
offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent
institutionalization without the showing required for commitment
or the opportunity for release afforded by [the Indiana civil
commitment statutes] deprive petitioner of equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment."

Jackson, 406 U.S. at

730.
Various courts have considered whether equal protection
is violated where a criminal defendant is not given credit for
pretrial time committed on a determination of incompetency, and
held that such credit is required.

See e.g. State v. Miranda,

779 P.2d 976, 979-80 (N.M. App. 1989) (confinement in a mental
hospital after arrest constitutes "official confinement" under
statute designed to ensure equal treatment); Pladson v. State,
385 N.W.2d 406, 409 (Minn. App. 1986) (credit for pretrial time
spent in hospital for competency examination is required);
Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949, 951 (Wash. 1974) (credit for
pretrial detention where accused is "unable to or precluded from
posting bail or otherwise procuring his release from confinement
prior to trial" is required); State v. Mackley, 552 P.2d 628
(Kan. 1976) (credit for time spent at hospital required).

10

The Macklev court reasoned:
Under the circumstances of this case, the
confinement at the state mental hospitals was
tantamount to being in jail. The physical place
of confinement is not important as the appellant
technically continued to be in jail while held in
custody at the hospitals. He was not free on
bail, had no control over his place of custody
and was never free to leave the hospitals.
552 P.2d at 629.
Reanier, cited favorably by the Utah Supreme Court in
Richards, 740 P.2d at 1315, considered the equal protection
analysis for determining whether credit for pretrial time served
should be given for time confined in the hospital identical to
the analysis for determining whether credit for time served
should be given where a defendant was unable to post bail.

In

Reanier, the Washington Supreme Court consolidated four cases.
The first case, Reanier, involved a defendant who was confined to
the state hospital on two occasions before sentence.
other cases, the defendants were unable to post bail.
fourth case, the defendant was held without bail.
P.2d at 949-51.

In two
In the

Reanier, 517

The Washington Supreme Court analyzed these

situations identically, labelling them all as situations where
the defendant was detained prior to trial because he was unable
to or precluded from posting bail.

The Court stated:

Fundamental fairness and the avoidance of
discrimination and possible multiple punishment
dictate that an accused person, unable to or
precluded from posting bail or otherwise
procuring his release from confinement prior to
trial, should, upon conviction and commitment to
a state penal facility, be credited against a
maximum and a mandatory minimum term with all
time served in detention prior to trial and

11

sentence. Otherwise, such a person's total times
in custody would exceed that of a defendant
likewise sentenced but who had been able to
obtain pretrial release.
Reanier, 517 P.2d at 951.

Hence, in reaching its decision in

Richards. the Utah Supreme Court relied on a case which directly
supports Appellant's position in this case.
Under an equal protection analysis, a defendant who is
not given credit for pretrial detention in the hospital is
treated differently from a defendant who is detained pretrial in
the jail.

See Richards, 740 P.2d 1314.

In addition, a defendant

such as Appellant who serves more time than the statutory maximum
sentence based on the trial judge's refusal to credit pretrial
time spent confined at the hospital is treated differently from
other mentally ill persons who can be committed only if certain
higher standards are established.

See Jackson, 406 U.S. at

723-25.
The decision in Jackson clarifies that criminal
commitment based on incompetency to proceed is part of a criminal
prosecution and subject to equal protection and due process
constraints on such prosecutions.

The Utah Supreme Court has

also explicitly clarified that criminal commitment proceedings
are part of a criminal prosecution, and that absent a criminal
prosecution, an individual with an identical mental illness might
not be detained.

In Ollerton v. Diamenti, 521 P.2d 899 (Utah

1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Mr. Diamenti was not involuntarily hospitalized
under the standards [of the civil commitment
statute]; he was declared "insane" [footnote
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omitted] and under the mandate of Section
77-48-5, U.C.A. 1953, he was committed to the
hospital and the criminal proceedings were
suspended. Although insane, he will be detained
in custody under the law to answer for his crime
upon becoming sane. TH1is detention in the
hospital is a consequence of his committing the
crime; otherwise, although his mental condition
were the same, he might not be so confined in the
present facility. His commitment to the state
hospital is part and parcel of the administration
of the criminal law. His bail was exonerated
upon commitment to the hospital [citation
omitted], and upon being certified sane, he will
be brought to trial. His detention is pursuant
to the provisions of the Criminal Code . . . .
Diamenti, 521 P.2d at 900 (emphasis added).
A review of the criminal commitment statutes, Utah Code
Ann. § 77-15-1 et. seq. demonstrates that a criminal defendant who
is confined to the Utah State Hospital on a determination that he
is incompetent to proceed is "in custody" or "incarcerated" while
so committed.

Upon a determination of incompetency, a criminal

defendant is "committed to the custody of the executive Director
of the Department of Human Services or his designee."
Ann. § 77-15-6(1) (emphasis added).

Utah Code

The director or his designee

designates "the specific placement of the defendant during the
period of evaluation and treatment to restore competency."

Utah

Code Ann. § 77-15-6(1); see Addendum C for complete text of Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-15-1 and 77-15-6.
Bail is exonerated "[w]hen a defendant awaiting trial is
committed to a mental health facility."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-8

(1995) ; see Addendum C for complete text of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-15-8.

Hence, a criminally committed defendant does not have
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the opportunity to bail out of the facility.
In addition, the statute refers to the "release" of the
defendant or the institution of civil commitment proceedings
under certain circumstances after the passage of certain amounts
of time.

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(9) and 12.

The use

of the terms "release" and "custody" demonstrate that a
criminally committed defendant is "incarcerated."

The equal

protection analysis in Richards is therefore easily extended to
the present case.
Appellant was confined for 257 days longer than a
similarly situated criminal defendant who was not found
incompetent.

A competent defendant who is able to post bail

would ultimately serve no more than the maximum sentence.

A

competent defendant who was unable to post bail would be given
credit for time served and ultimately be held no longer than the
maximum sentence.

Hence, an inequality exists as to the maximum

amount of time which can be served by competent and incompetent
defendants under the same circumstances.
In addition, Fife was held for 257 days based on the
lesser criminal commitment standard; mentally ill persons who are
not charged with a crime would not be held under these
circumstances.

See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 730.

An

inequality therefore exists between Fife and mentally ill persons
not criminally charged.

Fife was held 257 days on the lesser

criminal commitment standard.
The trial judge's failure to give Appellant credit for
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pretrial time confined at the Utah State Hospital also violates
due process and double jeopardy provisions of the federal
constitution.

See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 731.

In Jackson, the

United States Supreme Court reached its decision on both due
process and equal protection grounds.

It held on due process

grounds that "a person charged by the State with a criminal
offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to
proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period
of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the near future.
Jackson, 406 U.S. 738.

Where it is determined that there is not

a substantial likelihood that the criminal defendant will become
competent in the foreseeable future, civil commitment proceedings
must be instituted or the defendant released.

See also Reanier,

517 P.2d at 951 ("fundamental fairness" requires that defendant
who is unable to obtain release prior to trial be given credit
against his sentence).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-6(13) attempts to incorporate some
of the due process concerns of Jackson and clarifies that
criminal commitment at the Hospital cannot exceed the statutory
maximum period of incarceration for the crime charged.

It

states:
(13) In no event may the maximum period of
detention under this section exceed the maximum
period of incarceration which the defendant could
receive if he were convicted of the charged
offense. This subsection does not preclude
pursuing involuntary civil commitment nor does it
place any time limit on civil commitments.
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In addition, the Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy precludes multiple punishment for a single
offense.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072,

23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204, 101 L.Ed.2d 865
(1989); see Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971);
Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1041 (4th Cir. 1976) .

Pretrial

detention for a crime which is not credited towards the ultimate
sentence constitutes multiple punishment for a single offense.
Durkin, 538 F.2d at 1041; State v. Wietholter, 636 P.2d 101, 102
(Ariz. 1981).

This is particularly true where the defendant is

sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence for the crime.

See

State v. Cook, 679 P.2d 413, 414-15 (Wash. App. 1984); Reanier,
517 P.2d at 955.

In this case, the 257 days of confinement at

the Hospital was an additional sentence which exceeded the
maximum allowable sentence for the offense.

This additional

sentence constituted multiple punishment in violation of the
protection against double jeopardy.
This Court's decision in Rawlings v. Holden, 869 P.2d 958
(Utah App. 1994) ("Rawlings I"), does not alter the analysis and
conclusion that the protection against double jeopardy and
Appellant's rights to due process and equal protection were
violated in this case.5

5

Nor does this Court's decision in Ontiveros v. Utah
Board of Pardons, Case No. 940290-CA (Utah App. 1995), impact on
the decision in this case. In Ontiveros, this Court construed
(continued)
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In Rawlinas I, this Court held that the Board of Pardons, not the
district court, generally has the authority to give an inmate
credit for time served and that the Board's failure to give the
inmate credit for time which was served as a condition of
probation does not violate due process or impose double jeopardy.
Rawlinas I, 869 P.2d at 962.

The essence of the Rawlinas I

holding is that failing to credit jail and hospital time served
as a condition of probation does not violate due process or
double jeopardy protections.6
In reaching the decision in Rawlinas I, this Court
emphasized that "[w]hen a convicted defendant accepts probation,
he enters into an agreement with the sentencing court to comply
with the conditions of probation as established by the court in
exchange for not having to serve a prison sentence.
In the present case, the trial judge committed Fife to
the Hospital based on a finding that he was incompetent to
proceed.

Fife did not agree to being held at the Hospital as a

condition of probation.

Rather, he was confined to the Hospital

and not allowed to bail out prior to trial.

Unlike a voluntary

agreement to serve time at a secure treatment facility as a
condition of probation, the commitment in this case was

5

(continued) Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(3)(c) and held
that the Board of Pardons has broad discretion in determining
whether to give an inmate credit for time served while
incarcerated in another state on another crime. Appellant was
held in this state on this charge and raises a constitutional
rather than statutory argument.
6

Rawlinas I did not apply an equal protection analysis.
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"equivalent to time served in [jail] as punishment for committing
a crime."

Rawlinas I, 869 P.2d at 961.

Because the time at

issue was not served as a condition of probation, Rawlinqs I has
no bearing on this case.7
Under the circumstances of this case where the defendant
was confined or incarcerated pretrial at the Utah State Hospital
for 257 days, resulting in his serving 257 days beyond the
statutory maximum allowable sentence, Appellant Fife's rights to
due process, equal protection and freedom from double jeopardy
were violated.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
This case presents an issue which has never been directly
addressed by Utah appellate courts or the United States Supreme
Court.

Appellant is requesting that this Court apply the

holdings of State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987), and
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 2135
(1972), along with other cases, and hold that a defendant who is
criminally committed to the Utah State Hospital on a pretrial
determination of incompetency must be given credit for time

7

Appellant apparently served sixteen days after
sentencing as a condition of probation. R. 139. He was released
from the jail to the Adult Residential Treatment Unit, an
in-patient treatment facility. R. 64. The trial judge gave
Appellant credit for time served on the sixteen days of jail.
R. 98, 139-140. Appellant did not request and the trial judge
did not order credit for time served at the Adult Residential
Treatment Unit. There are no issues before this Court regarding
credit for time served as a condition of probation.
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served.

Oral argument and written opinion are therefore

warranted.

CONCLUSION
The trial court violated the protection against double
jeopardy and Appellant's rights to due process and equal
protection where it refused to give him credit for pretrial time
confined to the Utah State Hospital after a determination that he
was incompetent to proceed.

Appellant requests that this Court

reverse the portion of the trial court's order refusing to credit
such time and remand the case to the trial court for imposition
of a correct sentence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/3tt day of July, 1995.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, this

/3tL

day of July, 1995.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED this

day of July, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
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In the District Court of the Thircf J
in and for Salt Lake County,. S
* .

JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT
State of Utah,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 921901311
Attempted Forcible Sexual
Abuse
Count I

vs.
David Leslie Fife
Defendant.

A Class A Misdemeanor
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

July 18, 1994
This being the time fixed for passing of sentence upon the above named defendant,
said defendant appearing in person and being represented by Roger Scowcroft, as Counsel,
the State being represented by Ruth McCloskey, as Counsel. The defendant is now asked if
he has any legal cause to show why sentence should not be passed upon him in accordance
with section 77-35-9 U.C.A. The defendant answering he has none, therefore, judgment and
sentence is pronounced as follows:

C0DH7

It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you, David Leslie Fife, be
confined and imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail for a term of twelve
months. As provided by law for the crime of attempted forcible sexual abuse, a
Class A Misdemeanor.

The defendant is granted a stay of the above imposed sentence and placed on
probation in the custody of the Court and under the supervision of the A.P.P.D. for the
period of twenty-four (24) months, pursuant to the conditions listed in the file
March 13, 1995
The State's order to show cause hearing comes now before the Court for disposition.
The defendant appears in person and is represented by Roger Scowcroft as Counsel, The
State being represented by James Cope as Counsel. Based on the representations of Counsel
for the Defense and Counsel for the State, the Court finds that the defendant has violated the
terms of his probation and the same is revoked. The Court orders the defendant committed
to the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with the sentence heretofore imposed. The Court
further orders the defendant is to receive 265 days credit for time served. Commitment is to
issue forthwith.
You, Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah, are hereby commanded
to take the said David Leslie Fife and deliver him without delay to the Salt Lake County Jail,
then and there to be confined in accordance with the commitment heretofore imposed.

C0098

Issued:

March 16, 1995,
Honoii&jble Tyrone E. Medley

Deputy Clerk

00099

ADDENDUM B

FILED
* ! C "** P ' f* T

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, #5141
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

f^ltDT

DEPUTY CLERK
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
AGREED STATEMENT OF
THE RECORD ON APPEAL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 921901311

DAVID LESLIE FIFE,

HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, DAVID LESLIE FIFE, by and through
counsel, ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, pursuant to Rule 11(f) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and submits the following Agreed
Statement of the Record on Appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 24, 1992, Defendant was arrested on report of the
conduct alleged in this case and held without bail in the Salt Lake
County Jail.

On July 29, Defendant was released from jail having

served 5 days (Salt Lake County Jail records appended hereto).
On March 24, 1993, Defendant was again arrested on this and
on another charge and held without bail in the Salt Lake County
Jail.

On May 17, Defendant was adjudged incompetent to stand trial

00087

in this case.

On May 21, Defendant was committed and transported to

the Utah State Hospital by Order of the Third District Court in this
case, having served 58 days in jail.
On November 1, 1993, Defendant was transported back to the
Salt Lake County Jail and held without bail, having served 165 days
at the Utah State Hospital.

On February 3, 1994, Defendant was

again adjudged incompetent to stand trial in this case.

On

February 9, Defendant was again committed and transported to Utah
State Hospital by Order of the Third District Court in this case,
having served 100 days in jail.
On May 11, 1994, Defendant was transported back to the Salt
Lake County Jail and held without bail, having served 92 days at
Utah State Hospital.

On June 6, 1994, Defendant entered a plea of

guilty to Attempted Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third-degree felony,
having been adjudged competent to stand trial in the Third District
Court.

On July 18, 1994, Defendant was sentenced as a class A

misdemeanor pursuant to the provision of § 76-3-402(1), Utah Code
Ann. (1992), on motion of Defendant and stipulation of Plaintiff.
Defendant was placed on probation and, on August 3, 1994, was
released from jail, having served 84 days.
On February 23, 1995, Defendant was arrested on a bench
warrant issued by the Third District Court on this case on
allegation of probation violation, and held without bail in the Salt
Lake County Jail.

On March 6, Defendant admitted in open court that

he had violated the previously imposed terms of probation.

On

March 13, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley revoked Defendant's

- 2 -
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probation and ordered Defendant to serve the previously imposed
sentence of twelve months in jail.

The court granted Defendant

credit for all 265 days previously served in jail in this case, but
denied Defendant credit toward the sentence of incarceration for the
257 days served at Utah State Hospital pending the court's finding
of Defendant's competency to stand trial.
DATED this /t£>

day of March, 1995.

~^rr^)c^
CL

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT
Attorney for Defendant

STIPULATION
I, JAMES M. COPE, hereby stipulate to the accuracy of the
foregoing statement of facts.
DATED this

day of March, 1995.

JAMES M. COPE
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney

- 3-
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ORDER
Based upon agreement of the parties,
IT IS ORDERED THAT the above agreed statement of facts is
hereby approved as the record on appeal.

In addition to the above

Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal, the clerk shall submit all
of the papers filed in this Court.

The agreed statement of facts

and pleadings file from this Court shall comprise the record on
appeal.
DATED this

day of March, 1995.

TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Third Judicial District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, hereby certify that I have caused to
be delivered a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney's
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

/£?

day of March, 1995.

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT

DELIVERED this

d a y of March, 199,
MAK l C 1SS5

-
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Third Judicial District

MAY 1 6 1995

JOAN C. WATT, #3967
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, #5141
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

SALT LAKE COUNTY
Ci**

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

MOTION, STIPULATION AND
ORDER TO SUPPLEMENT AGREED
STATEMENT OF THE RECORD
ON APPEAL

v.
DAVID LESLIE FIFE,
Defendant/Appellant,

Case No. 921901311
Court of Appeals 950256-CA
HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY

COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, DAVID LESLIE FIFE, by and
through counsel of record, JOAN C. WATT and ROGER K. SCOWCROFT,
and moves the Court to supplement the Agreed Statement of the
Record on Appeal which was signed by the trial judge on April 6,
1995 with the following:
1.

On March 13, 1995, counsel for Defendant/Appellant

David Fife argued that the trial judge should give Defendant Fife
credit for all time he had served on the charge in this case.
Counsel for Defendant argued that such credit for time served
should include the time spent at the Utah State Hospital during
the competency proceedings.

The time spent at the Utah State

Hospital was 257 days, as set forth in the Agreed Statement of
the Record on Appeal.

2.

Defendant/Appellant Fife based his argument that he

should be given credit for time served at the Utah State Hospital
on State v. Richards, 740 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1987), and Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, 446 (1972), and the legal
concepts contained therein, as set forth more fully in
Defendant's Application for Certificate of Probable Cause found
at R. 100-105 of the District Court file in the instant case.
3.

The trial judge refused to give Defendant/Appellant

Fife credit for the 257 days spent at the Utah State Hospital.
DATED this

//

day of May, 1995.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney f o r Defendant/Appellant

ROGER K. SCOWCROFT^^ J
Attorney for Defei^far^/Appellant

STIPULATION
I, JAMES M. COPE, have read the foregoing motion and
stipulate to supplementation of the Agreed Statement of the
Record on Appeal as set forth therein.
DATED this

)]P* of May, 1995.

7K

SS M. COPE
5eputy District Attorney

ORDER
Based upon motion of Appellant and stipulation of counsel
and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Agreed Statement of the
Record on Appeal which was signed April 6, 1995 be supplemented
as set forth in the motion above.
DATED this

'r

day of May, 1995.
BY THE COURT:-

E . MEDLEY

i r i c t Court Judge
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ADDENDUM C

76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.

77-15-2. "Incompetent to proceed" defined.
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is incompetent to proceed if he is
suffering from a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting either in:
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense
charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.

77-15-3. Petition for inquiry as to defendant or prisoner
— Filing — Contents.
(1) Whenever a person charged with a public offense or serving a sentence
of imprisonment is or becomes incompetent to proceed, as defined in this
chapter, a petition may be filed in the district court of the county where the
charge is pending or where the person is confined.
(2) (a) The petition shall contain a certificate that it is filed in good faith
and on reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to
proceed. The petition shall contain a recital of the facts, observations, and
conversations with the defendant that have formed the basis for the
petition. If filed by defense counsel, the petition shall contain such
information without invading the lawyer-client privilege.
(b) The petition may be based upon knowledge or information and belief
and may be filed by the party alleged incompetent to proceed, any person
acting on his behalf, the prosecuting attorney, or any person having
custody or supervision over the person.

77-15-5. Order for hearing — Stay of other proceedings —
Examinations of defendant — Scope of examination and report.
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of
the defendant's competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of
the defendant's competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which
proceedings are pending shall stay all proceedings. If the proceedings are in a
court other than the district court in which the petition is filed, the district
court shall notify that court of the filing of the petition. The district court in
which the petition is filed shall pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of
incompetency. If a petition is opposed by either party, the court shall, prior to
granting or denying the petition, hold a limited hearing solely for the purpose
of determining the sufficiency of the petition. If the court finds that the
allegations of incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's
competency to stand trial, it shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental
condition of the person who is the subject of the petition.
(2) (a) After the granting of a petition and prior to a full competency
hearing, the court may order the Department of Human Services to
examine the person and to report to the court concerning the defendant's
mental condition.
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health
experts not involved in the current treatment of the defendant.
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if it becomes
apparent that the defendant may be incompetent due to mental retardation, at least one expert experienced in mental retardation assessment
shall evaluate the defendant. Upon appointment of the experts, the
petitioner or other party as directed by the court shall provide information
and materials to the examiners relevant to a determination of the
defendant's competency and shall provide copies of the charging document, arrest or incident reports pertaining to the charged offense, known
criminal history information, and known prior mental health evaluations
and treatments.
(d) The court may make the necessary orders to provide the information
listed in Subsection (c) to the examiners.
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the
executive director of the department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be
retained in the same custody or status he was in at the time the examination
was ordered.
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report
to the court consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined
to be relevant by the experts:
(a) the defendant's present capacity to:
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against
him;
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind;
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible
penalties, if applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings
against him;
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options;
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against
him;
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable;
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on
the nature and quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel;
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered:
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's
competency; and
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor
and affect and ability to participate in the proceedings.

(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed,
the expert shall indicate in the report:
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompetency;
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation
and its relationship to the factors contributing to the defendant's incompetency;
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to
restore competency.
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall provide an initial report to
the court and the prosecuting and defense attorneys within 30 days of the
receipt of the court's order. The report shall inform the court of the examiner's
opinion concerning the competency of the defendant to stand trial, or, in the
alternative, the examiner may inform the court in writing that additional time
is needed to complete the report. If the examiner informs the court that
additional time is needed, the examiner shall have up to an additional 30 days
to provide the report to the court and counsel. The examiner must provide the
report within 60 days from the receipt of the court's order unless, for good
cause shown, the court authorizes an additional period of time to complete the
examination and provide the report.
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts shall:
(a) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation;
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used in the examination and the purpose or purposes for each;
(c) state the expert's clinical observations, findings, and opinions on
each issue referred for examination by the court, and indicate specifically
those issues, if any, on which the expert could not give an opinion; and
(d) identify the sources of information used by the expert and present
the basis for the expert's clinical findings and opinions.
(8) (a) Any statement made by the defendant in the course of any competency examination, whether the examination is with or without the
consent of the defendant, any testimony by the expert based upon such
statement, and any other fruits of the statement may not be admitted in
evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an
issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced
evidence. The evidence may be admitted, however, where relevant to a
determination of the defendant's competency.
(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners should specifically
advise the defendant of the limits of confidentiality as provided under this
subsection.
(9) When the report is received the court shall set a date for a mental
hearing which shall be held in not less than five and not more than 15 days,
unless the court enlarges the time for good cause. The hearing shall be
conducted according to the procedures outlined in Subsections 62 A-12234(9)(b) through (9)(f). Any person or organization directed by the department to conduct the examination may be subpoenaed to testify at the hearing.
If the experts are in conflict as to the competency of the defendant, all experts
should be called to testify at the hearing if reasonably available. The court may
call any examiner to testify at the hearing who is not called by the parties. If
the court calls an examiner, counsel for the parties may cross-examine the
expert.

(10) A person shall be presumed competent unless the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, finds the person incompetent to proceed. The burden
of proof is upon the proponent of incompetency at the hearing. An adjudication
of incompetency to proceed shall not operate as an adjudication of incompetency to give informed consent for medical treatment or for any other purpose,
unless specifically set forth in the court order.
(11) (a) Ifthe court finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial, its order
shall contain findings addressing each of the factors in Subsections
77-15-5 (4)(a) and (b). The order issued pursuant to Subsection 77-15-6(1)
which the court sends to the facility where the defendant is committed or
to the person who is responsible for assessing his progress toward
competency shall be provided contemporaneously with the transportation
and commitment order of the defendant, unless exigent circumstances
require earlier commitment in which case the court shall forward the
order within five working days of the order of transportation and commitment of the defendant.
(b) The order finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial shall be
accompanied by:
(i) copies of the reports of the experts filed with the court pursuant
to the order of examination if not provided previously;
(ii) copies of any of the psychiatric, psychological, or social work
reports submitted to the court relative to the mental condition of the
defendant;
(iii) any other documents made available to the court by either the
defense or the prosecution, pertaining to the defendant's current or
past mental condition.
(12) Ifthe court finds it necessary to order the defendant transported prior
to the completion of findings and compilation of documents required under
Subsection (11), the transportation and commitment order delivering the
defendant to the Utah State Hospital, or other mental health facility as
directed by the executive director of the Department of Human Services or his
designee, shall indicate that the defendant's commitment is based upon a
finding of incompetency, and the mental health facility's copy of the order shall
be accompanied by the reports of any experts filed with the court pursuant to
the order of examination. The executive director of the Department of Human
Services or his designee may refuse to accept a defendant as a patient unless
he is accompanied by a transportation and commitment order which is
accompanied by the reports.
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial by the court, the
prosecuting and defense attorneys shall provide information and materials
relevant to the defendant's competency to the facility where the defendant is
committed or to the person responsible for assessing his progress towards
competency. In addition to any other materials, the prosecuting attorney shall
provide:
(a) copies of the charging document and supporting affidavits or other
documents used in the determination of probable cause;
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law enforcement agency
pertaining to the charged offense;
(c) information concerning the defendant's known criminal history.
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to insure compliance with
this section.
(15) Failure to comply with this section shall not result in the dismissal of
criminal charges.

77-15-6. Commitment on finding of incompetency to
stand trial — Subsequent hearings — Notice to
prosecuting attorneys.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (5), if after hearing, the person is found
to be incompetent to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant committed
to the custody of the executive director of the Department of Human Services
or his designee for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant
to competency. The court may recommend but not order placement of the
defendant. The court may, however, order that the defendant be placed in a
secure setting rather than a nonsecure setting. The director or his designee
shall designate the specific placement of the defendant during the period of
evaluation and treatment to restore competency.
(2) The examiner or examiners designated by the executive director to
assess the defendant's progress toward competency may not be involved in the
routine treatment of the defendant. The examiner or examiners shall provide
a full report to the court and prosecuting and defense attorneys within 90 days
of receipt of the court's order. If any examiner is unable to complete the
assessment within 90 days, that examiner shall provide to the court and
counsel a summary progress report which informs the court that additional
time is necessary to complete the assessment, in which case the examiner shall
have up to an additional 90 days to provide the full report. The full report shall
assess:
(a) the facility's or program's capacity to provide appropriate treatment
for the defendant;
(b) the nature of treatments provided to the defendant;
(c) what progress toward competency restoration has been made with
respect to the factors identified by the court in its initial order;
(d) the defendant's current level of mental disorder or mental retardation and need for treatment, if any; and
(e) the likelihood of restoration of competency and the amount of time
estimated to achieve it.
(3) The court on its own motion or upon motion by either party or by the
executive director may appoint additional mental health examiners to examine
the defendant and advise the court on his current mental status and progress
toward competency restoration.
(4) Upon receipt of the full report, the court shall hold a hearing to
determine the defendant's current status. At the hearing, the burden of
proving that the defendant is competent is on the proponent of competency.
Following the hearing, the court shall determine by a preponderance of
evidence whether the defendant is:
(a) competent to stand trial;
(b) incompetent to stand trial with a substantial probability that the
defendant may become competent in the foreseeable future; or
(c) incompetent to stand trial without a substantial probability that the
defendant may become competent in the foreseeable ftiture.
(5) (a) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), the court
shall proceed with the trial or such other procedures as may be necessary
to adjudicate the charges.
(b) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(b), the court
may order that the defendant remain committed to the custody of the
executive director of the Department of Human Services or his designee
for the purpose of treatment intended to restore the defendant to competency.
(c) If the court enters a finding pursuant to Subsection (4)(c), the court
shall order the defendant released from the custody of the director unless
the prosecutor informs the court that commitment proceedings pursuant
to Title 62A, Chapter 12, Mental Health, or Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services
to People with Disabilities, will be initiated. These commitment proceedings must be initiated within seven days after the court's order entering
the finding in Subsection (4)(c), unless the court enlarges the time for good
cause shown. The defendant may be ordered to remain in the custody of

the director until commitment proceedings have been concluded. If the
defendant is committed, the court which entered the order pursuant to
Subsection (4)(c), shall be notified by the director at least ten days prior to
any release of the committed person.
(6) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsection (5)(b), the court shall hold a hearing one year following the recommitment.
(7) At the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6), except for defendants
charged with the crimes listed in Subsection (8), a defendant who has not been
restored to competency shall be ordered released or temporarily detained
pending civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as provided in
Subsection (5)(c).
(8) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder, murder,
attempted murder, manslaughter, or a first degree felony and the court
determines that the defendant is making reasonable progress towards restoration of competency at the time of the hearing held pursuant to Subsection (6),
the court may order the defendant recommitted for a period not to exceed 18
months for the purpose of treatment to restore the defendant to competency
with a mandatory review hearing at the end of the 18-month period.
(9) Except for defendants charged with aggravated murder or murder, a
defendant who has not been restored to competency at the time of the hearing
held pursuant to Subsection (8) shall be ordered released or temporarily
detained pending civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as
provided in Subsection (5)(c).
(10) If the defendant has been charged with aggravated murder or murder
and the court determines that he is making reasonable progress towards
restoration of competency at the time of the mandatory review hearing held
pursuant to Subsection (8), the court may order the defendant recommitted for
a period not to exceed 36 months for the purpose of treatment to restore him
to competency.
(11) If the defendant is recommitted to the department pursuant to Subsection (10), the court shall hold a hearing no later than at 18-month intervals
following the recommitment for the purpose of determining the defendant's
competency status.
(12) A defendant who has not been restored to competency at the expiration
of the additional 36-month commitment period ordered pursuant to Subsection
(10) shall be ordered released or temporarily detained pending civil commitment proceedings under the same terms as provided in Subsection (5)(c).
(13) In no event may the maximum period of detention under this section
exceed the maximum period of incarceration which the defendant could receive
if he were convicted of the charged offense. This subsection does not preclude
pursuing involuntary civil commitment nor does it place any time limit on civil
commitments.
(14) Neither release from a pretrial incompetency commitment under the
provisions of this section nor civil commitment requires dismissal of criminal
charges. The court may retain jurisdiction over the criminal case and may
order periodic reviews to assess the defendant's competency to stand trial.
(15) A defendant who is civilly committed pursuant to Title 62A, Chapter 12,
Mental Health, or Title 62A, Chapter 5, Services to People with Disabilities,
may still be adjudicated competent to stand trial under this chapter.
(16) (a) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in this
section, other than those specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13),
shall be a motion to compel the hearing, or mandamus, but not release
from detention or dismissal of the criminal charges.
(b) The remedy for a violation of the time periods specified in Subsection (5)(c), (7), (9), (12), or (13) shall not be dismissal of the criminal
charges.
(17) In cases in which the treatment of the defendant is precluded by court
order for a period of time, that time period may not be considered in computing
time limitations under this section.

(18) At any time that the defendant becomes competent to stand trial, the
clinical director of the hospital or other facility or the executive director of the
Department of Human Services shall certify that fact to the court. The court
shall conduct a hearing within 15 working days of the receipt of the clinical
director's or executive director's report, unless the court enlarges the time for
good cause.
(19) The court may order a hearing or rehearing at any time on its own
motion or upon recommendations of the clinical director of the hospital or other
facility or the executive director of the Department of Human Services.
(20) Notice of a hearing on competency to stand trial shall be given to the
prosecuting attorney. If the hearing is held in the county where the defendant
is confined, notice shall also be given to the prosecuting attorney for that
county.

77-15-8. Bail exonerated on commitment of defendant.
When a defendant awaiting trial is committed to a mental health facility,
bail shall be exonerated.

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

